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ABSTRACT 
Resilient socioeconomic unsustainability poses a threat to democracy whose importance 
has yet to be fully acknowledged. As the prospect of sustainability transition wanes, so 
does perceived legitimacy of institutions. This further limits representative institutions’ 
ability to take action, making democratic deepening all the more urgent. I investigate this 
argument through an illustrative case study, the 2017 People’s Climate March. In a context 
of resilient unsustainability, protesters have little expectation that institutions might address 
the ecological crisis and this view is likely to spread. New ways of thinking about this 
problem and a new research agenda are needed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing ecological crisis has often been understood with reference to the idea of resilient 
systemic unsustainability. This concept has developed from the interaction between debates on 
socio-ecological systems (e.g., Redman et al. 2004) and interdisciplinary work on the idea of 
resilience (e.g., Gunderson 2000). Basically, resilient systemic unsustainability refers to the 
challenge of making desirable transformations in biophysical and socio-economic systems that 
tend to retain their characteristic unsustainability despite shocks and efforts to change them in 
more sustainable directions (see Holling 1973; Rotmans and Kemp 2008). 
Politics are often considered as a key factor contributing to the resilience of systemic 
unsustainability (Smith, Stirling and Berkhout 2005). Nevertheless, and despite growing 
scepticism about the possibility of redressing the current course (Blühdorn 2013), there are 
sustained scholarly efforts to envision innovative political reforms. Their goal is to conceive of 
new forms of governance to promote sustainability transition and to avert the worst consequences 
of the ecological crisis from following their course (Avelino et al. 2016). These contributions shed 
a light on the kind of political systems we would need in order to redress systemic unsustainability, 
and can also inform institutional and social action (Hess 2014). 
A limitation in current research, however, is that resilient systemic unsustainability is generally 
intended only as a problem for making policy progress necessary to address environmental crises: 
it is generally overlooked that it might pose problems for political systems as well (see Fischer 
2017). Whereas we are aware of negative consequences the resilient unsustainability of 
socioeconomic systems has from an environmental standpoint, its long-term political 
consequences have been overlooked so far.  
On the basis of my qualitative analysis of the 2017 People’s Climate March protesting against the 
Trump administration, I argue that the systemic unsustainability might undermine the perceived 
legitimacy of democratic institutions which, in turn, might further diminish the latter’s ability to 
solve problems. My study shows that activists striving towards environmental justice in the context 
of resilient, systemic unsustainability face momentous challenges and there is little or no 
expectations as to the ability of extant democratic institutions to redress the situation. Opposition 
against the Trump administration and its policies is a fundamental driver of the protest I am 
studying (see Tarrow and Mayer 2019). Here, however, I do not intend to document whether and 
to what extent activists mobilised against the Trump administration might claim that the 
government is illegitimate (see e.g., Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). Rather, I show that in the 
protest under examination, activists are not only critical about the administration, they are also 
sceptical about US democratic institutions’ ability to address the climate crisis. Interviewees show 
a belief in democratic participation as a means to spur change from the bottom-up. Their scepticism 
towards institutions is not rooted in disaffection with democratic values. Rather, it is based on a 
shared sense that the political, economic and social systems are entrenched in deeply unsustainable 
ways. As I show, activists’ views are consistent with arguments developed in the literature on 
resilient systemic unsustainability.  
My investigation of the effects of resilient systemic unsustainability on democratic institutions is 
hinged on the issue of legitimacy. In particular, as shown in greater detail later in the paper, I refer 
to the problem of output legitimacy. Crucial to democracy, output legitimacy regards the perceived 
quality of institutions’ response to problems, their capacity to address them (Rothstein 2009). In 
this sense, legitimacy varies depending on the extent to which there is a shared belief that 
institutions take actions that are proper or appropriate in dealing with perceived problems (see 
Bernstein and Cashore 2007).  
An important issue to reflect clearly emerges from my study: if a legitimate political system is one 
where there can be at least an expectation that claims to justice can be met, then the shared sense 
that institutions will fail to address vital problems, such as those connected to the ecological crisis, 
exposes democracy to another, largely overlooked crisis of legitimacy. In a context where 
democratic systems are already faced with unprecedented challenges, the issue of perceived 
legitimacy cannot be overlooked (Mansbridge 2017). This is a concerning issue that is starting to 
attract research interest and is deserving of greater attention (e.g., Fischer 2017). Indeed, as argued 
by Kuyper (2016), we urgently need new ways to think about the problem of democratic legitimacy 
in the face of political problems that globalisation is bound to face us with. My investigation offers 
a good basis to reflect upon what might occur if the emergency and intractability of socioeconomic 
unsustainability will be patent to an ever-growing section of the population. 
Of course, my argument is developed with regard to the US context. The installation of an anti-
environmentalist administration (Bomberg 2017) might have concurred to the development of the 
sceptical views I recorded. It is conceivable – one might even say, likely – that activists would be 
less sceptical with a more supportive or a less adverse government in power. Nevertheless, I 
consider ways in which the observations I made in this US-based case study and the reflections 
they elicit might be interesting also in other cases where democracies might fail to develop in their 
citizenry a reasonable expectation that unsustainability might be addressed. I agree with Hammond 
and Smith (2017: 12) that our democracies are constrained by the structural forces that generate 
unsustainability. We need to understand the potential threat posed by resilient systemic 
unsustainability to democratic systems if we are to protect and enable them to deal with the 
escalating ecological crisis before us. While providing a full or generalizable account of how 
systemic unsustainability might undermine developed democracies is beyond the reach of this 
paper, I intend to shed light on this issue to also suggest ways forward in addressing it. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section hosts two theoretical discussions. The first one 
focuses upon the idea of resilient socioeconomic unsustainability. The second one explores the 
tension between the pursuit of environmental justice and democratic legitimacy given a context of 
resilient socioeconomic unsustainability. Preceded by a methodological discussion, the ensuing 
section is devoted to insight generated from my investigation of the People’s Climate March. In 
the concluding section I reflect on the implications of this study, its strengths and limitations and 
suggest future directions for inquiry. 
 
2. RESILIENT SOCIOECONOMIC UNSUSTAINABILITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
DEMOCRACY 
The Resilience of Socioeconomic Unsustainability 
Socio-ecological systems have been central in research on environmental politics, offering social 
scientists one way to conceptualise the complex human-environment dynamics (Young et al. 
2006). The approach is based on the idea that social and ecological elements are intertwined in 
complex and adaptive ways: in some cases, it is possible to identify different, interacting parts 
whose configuration might be more or less desirable and amenable to change (see Berkes 2017). 
In particular, this approach has often been used to interpret complex problems where societal, 
technical and ecological problems interact (Williams and Woodson 2019) and to envision 
governance solutions (Borràs and Edler 2014) or to change them in more just directions (Salomon 
et al. 2019).  
In order to capture some important socioeconomic features of socio-ecological systems, 
researchers have often employed the idea of resilience (Cote et al. 20119). Following Walker et 
al. (2004: 5), resilience can be intended as ‘the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and 
reorganise while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, 
identity and feedbacks’ (see also Folke 2006; Adger 2000). When applied to an unsustainable 
system, resilience is not a desirable quality: such a system ‘defies’ efforts to fundamentally alter it 
towards a new, sustainable configuration. Today, it seems that industrial societies, both at the 
biophysical and increasingly so at the socio-economic level, are not just unsustainable 
(Krausmann, Schandl and Sieferle 2008). Their unsustainability is also resilient (see Gallopín 
2006). Under these circumstances the transition to a sustainable system might be essentially 
impossible. That is, ‘efforts to achieve long term change in critical societal subsystems currently 
plagued by persistent problems’ (Meadowcroft 2011: 71) are essentially in vain.1  
Although the problem of resilient unsustainable systems cannot be reduced only to a political 
economy matrix, there seems to be greater awareness that politics deserve particular attention 
(Avelino and Rotmans 2009). This has not always been the case: a tendency to overlook the 
genuinely political dimension of sustainability transition – and the messiness and conflict it 
involves – has been observed, among others, by Meadowcroft (2009), with respect, for instance, 
to research on transition management. Similarly, Avelino and Wittmayer (2016) have noted this 
trend also with respect to sustainability transition literature more generally. So, analyses that give 
due attention to political aspects in socio-ecological systems literature are a much needed 
contribution (e.g., Shove and Walker 2007; Rotmans and Kemp 2008). Phelan and colleagues 
 
1 I retain the expression ‘resilient unsustainability’ as is currently used in scholarship examining this 
problem, despite the potential paradox contained in this expression. The ‘resilient unsustainability’ 
argument excludes the possibility of unsustainable socio-economic systems being transformed in a 
desirable, sustainable way. It is entirely possible, however, that the current unsustainable configuration 
will leave way to another undesirable configuration in the future. That implies that systemic 
unsustainability might not be resilient after all. The expression ‘robust unsustainability’ might enable 
us to refer to the intractability of unsustainability in existing socio-technic systems without falling into 
to the abovementioned paradox (I am indebted to John Dryzek for this consideration). 
(2013: 202) go so far as to state that ‘the climate crisis remains intractable not because of climate 
system complexity, but because of the phenomenon’s political and economic dimensions’.  
Interestingly, the idea that socio-economic systems might be both unsustainable and resilient 
seems prominent among approaches that are otherwise substantially different from each other. 
Among them, it is worth mentioning that there are some approaches that do not only focus on how 
politics contribute to socio-economic resilient unsustainability but also on how the former affects 
the latter. Post-ecologist and neo-Gramscian analyses about the current environmental situation 
are cases in point.  
The basic claim of the post-ecologist approach is that since the late 1980s modernisation has 
induced culture and value shifts that preclude the achievement of ecological values and a transition 
into sustainable societies (e.g., Blühdorn 1997). Rather, these developments have led to a politics 
of unsustainability, a paradoxical situation whereby ‘advanced modern capitalist consumer 
democracies try and manage to sustain what is known to be unsustainable’ (Blühdorn and Welsh 
2007: 197; see also Blühdorn 2007). According to Blühdorn (2013: 18) strenuous efforts by 
ecologically committed actors (from activists to intellectuals to policy makers and government 
agencies at all levels) have failed to bring about radical ecological change that contemporary 
consumer democracies would need. A post-ecologist turn is paralleled by a post-democratic one 
(e.g., Crouch 2004), a ‘simulative democracy’ whereby citizens willingly engage in a performance 
of democracy to respond to the ‘inherent contradictory value preferences and needs of 
contemporary citizens’ (Blühdorn 2013: 29). To Blühdorn (2013: 29), ‘these new forms of 
governance are an indispensable tool for the management of sustained unsustainability … [I]n a 
seemingly paradoxical sense they democratise the politics of unsustainability and thereby 
substantially increase societal resilience to sustained unsustainability’.  
From a neo-Gramscian perspective the resilience of unsustainability stems from a hegemonic 
historical bloc in contemporary political economy and reproduces practices that undermine 
systemic sustainability (Levy and Newell 2005). In a nutshell, according to this view, the limited 
progress in the transition to sustainability is related to the fact that at the heart of socio-technical 
systems lie historical blocks resisting transition. In the words of Phelan and colleagues (2013: 
215): ‘Maintaining overall Earth system resilience depends on undermining perverse resilience of 
hegemonic blocs within the Earth system’. This is important as it highlights that, far from being 
only a question of science, an issue of technology or an economic problem, systemic 
unsustainability, is also and fundamentally a socio-political challenge (see also IPCC 2008).  
Scholars of different strands, including the more radical and critical ones mentioned above, seem 
to agree that the problem of resilient systemic unsustainability can be aptly framed in terms of 
climate justice (Anshelm and Hansson 2011). Against this background, though not unproblematic, 
the role of social movements and civil society organisations is deemed important in sustainability 
transitions (Seyfang et al. 2010; Hargreaves et al. 2011) and to environmental politics more 
generally (Dryzek et al. 2003; Schlosberg 2009). These actors are fundamental in articulating 
justice claims that democratic institutions can neglect at the price of further eroding their perceived 
legitimacy. In sum, sustainable resilient systemic sustainability is a problem that political systems 
have contributed to create and that exacerbate injustice. One could say that resilient systemic 
sustainability is not just a problem created by politics but is also a problem for political systems 
and, in particular, one that poses serious issues of justice. 
 
The Tension between Claims to Justice and Democratic Legitimacy 
Understanding the relationship between problems of justice and democratic life represents a 
longstanding, difficult challenge for both theoretical and empirical research (e.g., Miller 1978; 
Young 2000). Justice and democracy are two related yet distinct concepts and, as Goodin (2004: 
72) put it, justice is ‘ordinarily regarded as an attribute of outcome’ while democracy ‘as an 
attribute of process’. Notwithstanding deep differences between these two ideas, there have been 
attempts at considering the two issues together (see Van Parijs 2011; Dryzek 2013). Interestingly, 
a wealth of scholarship has focused on the relationship between justice and democracy right in the 
context of environmental politics (see e.g., Schlosberg 2009; Gellers and Jeffords 2018). Although 
synergies and tensions in the quest for democracy and environmental justice have been envisioned, 
the idea of systemic unsustainable resilience has not been central to these analyses. 
In an effort to deepen our understanding of justice and democracy as distinct yet related 
phenomena, in this paper I investigate activists’ claims and reflect upon their implications in terms 
of perceived democratic legitimacy. My decision to focus on legitimacy problems is based on 
similar efforts by previous scholarship investigating the relationships between justice and 
democracy (see e.g., Dobson 1998; Humphrey 2006). I rely on concepts widespread in social 
movement studies that distinguish between claims pertaining to diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational frames. According to a well-established distinction, claims referring to diagnostic 
frames single out a problem and attribute responsibility for it; prognostic frames articulate a 
proposed solution; and motivational frames, meanwhile, define a call for action (Snow and 
Benford 1988). By reducing the discussion on justice to claims made by activists I deliberately 
refrain from making normative considerations about justice. Rather, using a more sociological 
approach, I intend to reconstruct the contents of activists’ claims. As seen, these actors and their 
opinions play an important role in understanding the trajectory of environmental politics in 
democracies.  
In reducing the idea of democracy to a specific type of legitimacy (perceived legitimacy) I engage 
in a similar operation as I do for justice. I do not formulate normative assessments about the idea 
of democracy. Rather, I limit myself to observing how an important element of any democratic 
order, such as perceived legitimacy, might be affected by political developments in the context of 
resilient, systemic unsustainability. Today, environmental concerns are spreading widely and 
representative institutions are being increasingly questioned (Norris 2011). I agree with 
Mansbridge (2017: 2) that in light of the challenges facing our democracies ‘every ounce of both 
normative and perceived legitimacy is becoming increasingly precious’. Furthermore, as she 
argues (2017: 3) the expectation of our political systems being able to address ecological problems 
is especially important now to the extent that ‘we must now ourselves produce vital free use goods 
– such as clean air, clean water, a reproducible number of fish and trees, and a stable climate – that 
in an earlier era “nature” provided’.  
Activism has been key to the success of a long list of struggles for democracy and environmental 
justice (Brulle 2010). At the same time, a wealth of empirical research highlights substantial 
limitations with extant democratic processes when it comes to environmental problems (e.g., 
Hendriks 2009). Promoting environmental justice through democratic engagement often 
represents a difficult enterprise (Agyeman, Bullard and Evans 2002) and activists’ contestation 
offers a very interesting source of insight to reflect on the problems that systemic unsustainability 
might pose to democracy. The issue is not only that, as correctly highlighted by most accounts, 
existing institutions seem unable to guarantee a sustainability transition. Rather, another problem 
is that the absence of a sustainability transition threatens democracy. Meadowcroft (2011: 71) is 
correct when he says that: ‘Politics is the constant companion of socio-technical transitions, 
serving alternatively (and often simultaneously) as context, arena, obstacle, enabler, arbiter, and 
manager of repercussions’. In this paper, I add that there is a concrete risk that democratic politics 
might be the victim of a socio-economic system that is unsustainable and resiliently so.2  
In a recent contribution to the debate on climate governance, John Dryzek frames succinctly and 
effectively the twofold link connecting justice and legitimacy. Commenting on a study by 
Bäckstrand and Kuyper (2017) focused on transnational governance of climate change, Dryzek 
(2017: 791) argues that output legitimacy ‘is a direct function of effectiveness’ – that is, the 
performance of a given system affects the way in which people see such a system as being more 
or less legitimate. Furthermore, he claims, ‘perceived legitimacy facilitates compliance with 
collective agreements, and … democratic processes in general do better than their alternatives 
when it comes to ecological problems’. This view is consistent with extant research showing how 
perceived performance is an important determinant of legitimacy among citizens (e.g., Dahlberg, 
Linde and Holmberg 2015) and with studies on perceived legitimacy and compliance (e.g., Marien 
and Hooghe 2011; Dalton 2004). Furthermore, Dryzek’s view that (more) democracy represents 
the way forward in tackling environmental problems is not only generally supported in academic 
debates, but it is also widely shared, as we will see, across activists circles.  
 
2 In a Nature opinion piece sociologist Nico Stehr (2015: 450) argued against tendencies in scientific 
circles to criticises democracies for failure to tackle climate change claiming that ‘the erosion of 
democracy is an unnecessary suppression of social complexity and rights’. Whilst agreeing with this 
view, in this paper, I seek to highlight that resilient socio-economic unsustainability might well favour 
democratic erosion. 
What is concerning, however, is that in the case I discuss below there seem to be challenges with 
respect to all of the above-mentioned issues. Firstly if, as argued, effectiveness enhances output 
legitimacy, the fact that essentially there is no substantial expectation of US democratic institutions 
to deliver on environmental challenges is problematic. Second, this negatively impacts perceived 
legitimacy and it also puts compliance with decision by democratic institutions at risk, at least to 
the extent that, as argued, compliance is dependent on (shrinking) output legitimacy. Finally, 
whilst an in-depth reflection on the performance of democratic (or alternative) processes with 
regard to ecological problems is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems necessary to reflect about 
whether activists and citizens will continue to hold a preference for democratic processes in the 
face of a failure to address systemic unsustainability. 
In the next part of the paper, I offer an overview of the research methodology. I then present my 
case study and highlight its main insights. Then, I discuss my observations in the wider context of 
the debate on the resilience of unsustainable socio-economic systems. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDY 
To support my argument I draw illustrations from original empirical evidence from a qualitative 
study. My discussion of the People’s Climate March is not mainly aimed at exploring the 
complexities of the People’s Climate movement in their full extent (cf. Fisher 2018) – although 
this study does provide insight on this understudied movement. Since the arguments here are 
mainly theoretical, my analysis of the effects of systemic, resilient unsustainability on democratic 
legitimacy is best understood as an illustrative study. The strength of illustrative case studies does 
not lay in the thorough exposition of events under examination. Rather, they are better suited to 
develop alternative theoretical perspectives on problems or to generate research hypotheses (or 
hints) to empirically explore some dimensions of a given problem that tend to be overlooked 
otherwise (see Levy 2008). My approach to the case study is also interpretive (see Yanow 2006) 
and, in particular, my analysis is based on what is known in social movement studies as frame 
analysis (Lindekilde 2014). These type of interpretive efforts have been deemed fundamental to 
understanding systemic problems affecting democratic systems (Ercan, Hendriks and Boswell 
2016), including socioeconomic unsustainability.  
Dara were generated through interviews and consultation of documents. During a month-long 
fieldtrip in April 2017, I interviewed ten activists recruited through snowball sampling. They were 
based in Boston and New York City, two of the most active hubs of the People’s Climate March. 
These activists belonged to a variety of groups including one student organisation for fossil fuel 
disinvestment, two environmental organisations of concerned mothers, one international 
environmental policy organisation, one national organisation for racial justice, and four state-level 
branches of national environmental and conservation organisations, all of which were directly 
involved in the organising committee of the People’s Climate March. Interviews were semi-
structured and lasted around 30 minutes. They were aimed at unearthing activists’ motivations for 
protesting the Trump administration, their understanding of the march within the context of their 
own organisations’ broader strategies and their views on environmental problems as well as on the 
solutions they envisioned. I manually transcribed the interviews and developed a thematic analysis, 
coding all references to the organisations’ role within the People’s Climate movement, their key 
concerns, views on climate change and expectations. 
Consulted documents were written by the groups I studied and by the People’s Climate March 
organisers. I explored the online materials (including social media – Facebook and Twitter) of 
every organisation, including a dozen websites and about 30 social media accounts. Furthermore, 
before or after interviews I collected printed public documents (about half of the organisations 
provided materials, generally leaflets). I also consulted the People’s Climate March official 
website as well as Twitter and Facebook accounts. I qualitatively analysed the content of these 
documents, paying special attention to communications about the march. These efforts offered 
guidance in preparing and analysing the interviews and enabled me to better understand the 
different organisations and their stance with respect to the broader People’s Climate Movement.  
 
The People’s Climate March. Activist Politics in Times of Systemic, Resilient Unsustainability 
The People’s Climate March on 29 April 2017 in Washington DC was attended by an estimated 
200,000 people, and other marches took place simultaneously in 3,000 other US cities. The march 
protested against the environmental policies of the Trump administration, on occasion of the 100th 
day of its installation in power. This protest can be seen in continuity with previous manifestations 
such as the 2014 People’s Climate March held in New York City and across the globe and with 
the Global Climate March taking place in November 2015 in occasion of the Paris summit on 
climate change. Nevertheless, the 2017 march’s focus against the US administration distinguishes 
this nation-level oriented mobilisation from previous marches, sharing similar ideas but casting 
them against a more global stage. 
As mentioned, using the language of frame analysis, I identify some statements of the People’s 
Climate March activists. The excerpts concern activists’ views on contemporary environmental 
politics and are illustrative of their diagnostic claims, which are those that identify problems and 
relevant actors. The words of an environmental justice campaigner describing the Climate Justice 
Alliance, a network involved in the organisation of the People’s Climate March, is indicative of a 
shared framing informing the protest:  
‘[we are] focused only, mostly on just transitions. This idea that we need to account for – as 
we move away from fossil fuels, as we move away from toxics, from industries that harm 
communities – … for what happens to those communities once those industries go away. 
[We make] it much more about justice because traditionally … this is just one example: coal 
has been part of the culture in West Virginia forever and the coal industry is dying due to 
market forces and due to the fact that it’s a terrible pollutant and as results those industries 
no longer exist and those industries support the entire economy of the region in West 
Virginia. So, what happens to the workers once that industry dies? We spent a lot of time 
thinking about [it]: it’s not the workers that we have a tension with. In this work, in 
environmental work, you can’t be focused on lambasting or thinking negatively at the 
workers, it is about the underlying system which had them working in an unsustainable 
industry’.3 
There is an acknowledgement of the systemic nature of unsustainability.  
Moreover, unsustainability is seen as an entrenched problem, further exacerbated by the election 
of Donald Trump. The Trump administration is understood both in continuity with the past – as 
yet another manifestation of systemic unsustainability – and as a break from it – as an altogether 
greater, shocking challenge to sustainability. As a progressive environmentalist activist reported:  
‘I think the Climate March was called when and by people who thought that Hillary 
Clinton would be president at the time [giggle]. So, it was really conceived as a way to 
make sure that Hillary Clinton got also pressure from the left, from the climate movement 
 
3 Interviewee 1, 18 April 2017 
and that she wasn’t given a free pass on this stuff. Obviously, it turns out that wasn’t the 
case’.4 
Another interviewee commented: 
‘Trump has organized a lot of people… all the groups have doubled or tripled in size since 
Trump got elected. People are so worried and they are so bothered and so angry that people 
are coming, people are going to demonstrations to meetings that never happened before’.5 
 
Overall, the election of Donald Trump has amplified the need for mobilising against a system that 
has long been characterised by unsustainability.  
Moving beyond the diagnostic framework, a second set of considerations concerns activists’ 
prognosis: their envisioned strategies to address the current situation. The prognostic claims 
reported below show that the People’s Climate March is an effort to counter an entrenched 
systemic problem through a social and political coalition that is as far-reaching as possible. The 
Trump administration is seen more as a tragic opportunity to re-organise the struggle against an 
unsustainable order rather than something altogether new. In the words of one environmental 
justice campaigner, for instance: 
‘The People’s Climate March is about articulating a new vision for what climate justice looks 
like. Especially with people like … Donald Trump, it’s critical that the public comes together 
defiant to the insanity that this administration is seeking to bring into communities’.6  
He added:  
 
4 Interviewee 3, 24 April 2017 
5 Interviewee 10, 13 April 2017 
6 Interviewee 1, 18 April 2017 
‘If you look at the history of the environmental movement, certainly in the last 20 years we 
haven’t met that many victories, in the last 15–20 years the big victories that we got ... It 
wasn’t that Washington insiders were able to [lock] in those victories, and it wasn’t that the 
grassroots alone [locked in] those victories, it was the trust and the transparency between the 
two that actually [cultivated] those wins and it’s something that this movement hasn’t quite 
understood yet. What it takes to win, in my view the only way to win in this world, is to 
align the frontline perspectives with the inside game’.  
A volunteer for a progressive environmentalist organisation framed the matter thus: 
‘Within the climate movement we are towards the left wing of it, in the sense seeing the 
climate issue and the solution to is as being conjoined with the solution to a number of other 
social problems, particularly the problems of inequality of all, class, race. In our work we 
talked about climate justice not just climate change … one of our real objectives [is] to 
broaden what the constituency of the climate movement is. Environmentalism in the US has 
had a long history of being an elite movement and we see this as being something different, 
climate change is something that affects everybody and we are not up to preserve some little 
paradise for a few people to enjoy, we are out to build a new world in a whole lot of ways. 
So, that means that in our coalition we are not just interested in how many people we can get 
out tomorrow, we are interested in bringing in new sectors and engaging the labour 
movement and engaging people that are dealing with racial justice issues, people who are 
dealing with housing issues to bring them into and connect those movements with the climate 
movement and we see that, you see that it’s interlinked’.7 
 
7 Interviewee 4, 24 April 2017 
Similarly, one of the leaders of an organisation of environmentally concerned mothers 
commented with respect to the People’s Climate March: 
‘I didn’t expect that, the way that it [the People’s Climate March] is bringing together the 
labour and environmental groups. I mean it has done that, it’s always been people’s march 
and it’s always been about the bigger picture to broaden the climate message to include 
voices beyond environmental groups’.8 
Activists deem efforts to build as vast as possible a coalition of different constituencies are all 
the more fundamental to generate popular support for systemic change since systemic 
unsustainability is not going to be addressed by institutions.  
Importantly, activists’ struggles are conducted in the midst of a growing recognition of the near 
impossibility of achieving the extent of change that would be needed to avert severe 
environmental and social damage. This emerges if we look at the third type of frame concerning 
motivational calls for action, which are reported below. 
As a civil rights campaigner commented:  
‘The reason that I have some concerns about the national mobilization is again the level of 
resources I know goes into it. … When you see all resources going to that, when you have 
communities that aren’t even drinking clean water. On the one hand, someone would say 
the Climate March is about the bigger picture and you know if we have attention and if we 
shift the policy on the bigger picture, then, eventually that will help those communities. If 
there was more of a certainty that that was true, I would be more in favour of it, even some 
degree of probability [giggle], I would be more in favour, but I haven’t necessarily seen 
that in any metrics. But on the positive side, certainly, you know, the women’s march for 
 
8 Interviewee 9, 28 April 2017 
example that was really powerful … and even the science march also … it was good to see 
those messages, it was good to see that conversation that resulted from it … that hadn’t 
necessarily happened before and raising awareness and maybe potentially raising action 
and political will. So, all of that is a possibility, and it’s there and I think it will happen to 
some degree, the question is cost-benefit in terms of ‘to what degree’ and ‘is it worth all of 
the time, effort, resources et cetera that is going into it’’?9 
An environmentalist and mother campaigner also commented thus: 
‘The People’s Climate March has a lot of labour people in addition to a lot of 
environmental groups, and then like corporate sort of more like socialism type of groups, 
like economic-based groups, so I think the different groups come together around different 
pieces of work but then you form the relationship and then you can say: ‘oh this 
representative who’s against us on this energy piece, he is really tied into labour’, so then 
in my mind I go back: ‘oh, can we reach out to our friends in the labour movement to see if 
they have a relationship with that rep and say: ‘hey we care about climate change too, you 
need to change there too’’.10 
As the above excerpts suggest, also in this movement the inspired struggle to attain systemic 
change needs to be combined with more practical efforts for change in line with different actors’ 
priorities (see Yearley 2013). This is particularly important since necessary systemic change at the 
social and ecological level seems beyond reach in light of the national context. 
Finally, expectations to attain the necessary changes at the systemic level vary, yet hopeful 
statements seem more often accompanied by apprehension, rather than confidence as to the ability 
 
9 Interviewee 5, 26 April 2017 
10 Interviewee 9, 28 April 2017 
of institutions to spur desirable change. As an environmentalist campaigner put it: ‘We have a 
clear idea of what is just, I don’t think that we have any understanding of how it is that we get 
there’.11 A leftist environmentalist interviewee, instead, remarked: 
‘[change] It’s not gonna come from Trump but it may come from other parts, parts of the 
Democratic Party starting to actually, and some of them already are, push hard on this to be 
less compromising, to really force the issue around the climate along with many other 
issues that are coming up. I mean you know we weren’t expecting to be in a situation 
where we were to defend the meagre healthcare plan [giggle], that we sort of won in the 
previous experience. So, in some ways it’s not exactly what we planned. But I think that 
the coalition that it’s built around it is one that is strategic in a long-range sense, really 
starting to have an impact not just by increasing our numbers in a particular demonstration 
but by increasing our penetration in the sectors that hadn’t been involved previously. So, 
we are very optimistic, I think, about how things are going, I mean as optimistic as you can 
be with the maniac in charge [giggle]’. He, then, specified: ‘We would like to take steps in 
the right direction but not taking wrong ones is the least we can do’.12 
According to a local leader of the student disinvestment movement:  
‘I think that People’s Climate March is going to … get a lot of people active, excited and 
willing to work but the number of pathways of change is going to be so many, so abundant 
that it’s gonna be difficult to see concise changes there’.13 
 
11 Interviewee, 1, 18 April 2017 
12 Interviewee 4, 24 April 2017 
13 Interviewee 2, 11 April 2017 
Overall, if a more sustainable course is to occur at all, it seems unwarranted to expect institutions 
to favour desirable developments. 
To sum up, the People’s Climate March activists’ view of the contemporary environmental 
situation features at least three particularly interesting aspects. First, their target, the Trump 
administration, can be seen as yet another, most dramatic manifestation of systemic, resilient 
unsustainability of the socioeconomic system. Together with a momentous challenge, the 
administration offers an opportunity to reorganise environmentalist and progressive forces. 
Second, the main form of this reorganisation seems to concern the effort towards coalition 
building. However, the ability to actually break systemic unsustainability and steer the system 
towards a just transition is seen as an unlikely outcome. Indeed, thirdly, a sense that democratic 
institutions might be failing to deliver justice and sustainability is widespread among activists. As 
I argued in my theoretical reflections, this tendency undermines perceived legitimacy and might 
negatively affect compliance. The more dramatic effects might be manifest if awareness of a 
failure to address systemic unsustainability spreads beyond activist circles, which seems likely to 
occur if the unsustainability resilience thesis is correct.  
 
4. DISCUSSION 
In this paper I shed a light on how the failure to address the environmental crisis affects 
democracies. In my investigation of the People’s Climate March I have showed that there seems 
to be a shared sense that institutions will not be able to redress the deeply entrenched 
unsustainability of the systems we live in. This goes beyond the well-documented disappointment 
experienced by some activists when dealing with institutions or the possibility of failing to address 
urgent problems that environmentalists are also familiar with (see Temper et al. 2015; Hendriks 
2009). Indeed, the prognosis, diagnosis and motivational frameworks of the activists I interviewed 
seems to overlap with the critical positions characteristic of literature on resilient systemic 
unsustainability where there is little or no expectation that institutions will be able to address the 
environmental crisis. To the extent that the systemic unsustainability worsens and its effects 
become more tangible the sceptical views might further expand to the detriment of the perceived 
legitimacy of democratic institutions.  
The resilience of socio-economic unsustainability places democracy at risk because it contributes 
to undermine output legitimacy. Scholars and commentators often claim that poor economic 
conditions and increasing inequality threaten democracy (della Porta 2015). This insight is 
obviously important. However, the way in which a major development in our societies such as 
systemic unsustainability threatens democracy should receive more attention. Against a tendency 
to overlook the effect that unsustainability bears on democracy, this papers seeks to spur attention 
to the consequences of systemic resilient unsustainability for democracy. Continuing to bend the 
non-human world to human needs and wants has its dangers. By doing this, we are consolidating 
conditions for the Earth system to become increasingly unstable and inhospitable to cherished 
human institutions such as democracy. The US case might be particularly problematic in light of, 
for instance, the environmental record of the country and anti-environmentalist policies of its 
administration. Nevertheless, this issue should receive attention across democracies. Recent 
protests, especially by young generations across the globe, show that the perceived inability of 
institutions to address the ecological crisis is transnational in nature (Wahlström et al. 2019). We 
should not wait for degrading systemic conditions to trigger popular upheavals or to generate 
problems that strain institutions’ capacity to function.  
Systemic resilient unsustainability fuels broader democratic malaise. The recent Gilets Jaunes 
protests in France show that ecological and social justice problems are increasingly entangled (also 
in the eyes of citizens) and hard to solve by representative institutions in established democracies. 
Triggered by a perceived injustice connected to an environmental policy on fuel pricing, the Gilets 
Jaunes movement protest has quickly turned into a popular movement articulating a systemic 
critique that targets also representative institutions (Poissenot 2018). President Emmanuel 
Macron’s willingness to undertake an unprecedented experiment in deliberative democracy in 
response to this crisis might be interpreted as a sign of the waning ability of traditional institutions 
alone to address the challenges before them and as an opening to experimenting with democratic 
innovation.  
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses might refine our understanding of the problem at hand 
and advance the discussion laid out in this paper. Quantitative research should test on a large scale 
how systematic unsustainability and low levels of perceived legitimacy across countries relate to 
each other. Going beyond my focus on an illustrative case based on climate protesters in the US, 
qualitative researchers might deepen our understanding of how different actors might come to 
perceive different political systems as increasingly undemocratic as they fail to address 
sustainability issues and quantitative analysis.  
More generally, two lines of inquiry should receive increasing attention in order to understand how 
systemic unsustainability undermines democracy. The first one rotates around the question of 
whether and how different sources of democratic legitimacy can be fostered in the context of the 
politics of unsustainability. For instance, might decline in output legitimacy at the federal level be 
redressed by effective movement and institutional action at the local or at the transnational level, 
as some activists and scholars suggest? (Fischer 2017).  
The second one, instead, regards the implications of systemic, resilient unsustainability for future 
developments of political regimes. Which political regime will citizens and political actors look at 
if the perception of the failure to address socio-economic unsustainability will spread widely 
beyond activist circles? Debates about contemporary political developments often envision a 
tension between authoritarian or illiberal forces, on the one hand, and, on the other, democratic 
deepening efforts (Fung and Wright 2003). Taking the idea of resilient unsustainability seriously 
poses challenges to both alternatives, though the latter remains certainly preferable (see e.g., 
Dryzek and Stevenson 2011; Niemeyer 2013; cf. Shearman and Smith 2007). Authoritarian 
regimes on environmental and other matters tend to fare worse than democratic ones, and therefore 
seem to be unlikely candidates for actually solving systemic unsustainability (Niemeyer 2014). At 
the same time, whilst we should not accept ‘the limits of contemporary liberal democratic practice 
as the limits of democracy as such’ (Hammond and Smith 2017: 1), it is problematic to expect that 
future generations (who might be likely to act under conditions of greater unsustainability) will 
build the democratic institutions that were needed in the present moment. The climate strike 
movement is explicitly making the demand that if governments do not act, they are illegitimate. If 
socio-economic systemic unsustainability is here to stay, we need to take this phenomenon more 
seriously in order to address the present and future challenges it generates. Understanding that 
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